Hi all good and bad DC users and developers out there.
I guess it's time to reveal second largest exploit in NMDC
history that I found about 9 months ago. Do you remember the good old CTM exploit
discovered by Team Elite
back in 2006? Well, this one is pretty much alike.How does it work?
Extremely easy I would say, all you need to do is to send malicious active search request
to any vulnerable hub:
How it should be
$Search 220.127.116.11:12345 F?F?0?1?mp3|
How we do it
$Search 18.104.22.168://22.214.171.124:12345 F?F?0?1?mp3|
is your own IP address and 126.96.36.199:12345
is the target IP address with port number that we would like to flood using UDP traffic
. In most cases your own IP address needs to be real, because the hub might ignore your search request or even kick you due to mismatch between your real IP address and the one stated in the request.
If the hub is not filtering requests with invalid port number, a vulnerable hub, it will broadcast the message to all its users. Each user who shares any MP3 files on the hub will then respond by sending 10 search results using UDP traffic to address 188.8.131.52:12345
mentioned in our example.
That is one malicious request in one hub, now imagine thousands of bots sending these malicious requests non stop to several public hubs
with 5000 users on each, you should be able to hear a bomb exploding on target side. I did alot of tests actually, and came up to receiving traffic at speed of 1 Gbit/s, at that point hardware limits were reached. It should be possible to push the record even higher with better hardware. What is servers mistake?
In above example 184.108.40.206://220.127.116.11:12345
the server takes 18.104.22.168
as the IP address of the request, which is correct, and //22.214.171.124:12345
as the port number of the request. Does the second part look like a port number? Not to me, but to server it does, sadly.What is clients mistake?
In above example 126.96.36.199://188.8.131.52:12345
the client takes 184.108.40.206://
as invalid protocol of the request, and 220.127.116.11:12345
as the IP address and port number of the request, which are correct. I keep wondering for long time, but can't understand yet why DC++
and other clients
apply function Util::decodeUrl
on active search request address. I was on the other hand very glad when I saw that clients didn't apply that function on active CTM request
. Which servers are vulnerable?
The only hub software that initially did check for invalid port in CTM and Search request was FlexHub
, any other hub servers were forwarding the requests as is, allowing the exploit. I fixed the exploit in Verlihub 1.0.0 RC2
as of 2014-06-14 and about same time Lord_Zero fixed it in his HeXHub
. Today we can see that most largest hubs
on DC run PtokaX
, which is still vulnerable.
It is now known that exploit has been fixed in PtokaX
version 18.104.22.168 as of 2015-02-20.Which clients are vulnerable?Every single one of them are.
I was only looking at DC++
and few other
based on them. The exploit is fixed in AirDC++
version 2.91 and in FlylinkDC++
, all versions since 2015-02-21. DC++ fixed the bug since release version 0.851. StrongDC++
are still vulnerable.What's the most interesting part?
The most interesting part about this exploit is that UDP protocol is portless, meaning that target server will receive all UDP traffic regardless
of any open ports or firewalls at server level. By sending as much traffic as target server download speed allows, you will overwhelm the target connection and the server will no longer respond.What can we do about it?
Fix this, sure, but how? If we look back at CTM exploit
, yet today we see hubs that don't check for valid IP address in CTM requests
, from that we can learn that there will always be hubs running old vulnerable hub servers even after 10 years. By that I'm trying to say that first of all fix should be implemented in DC clients, to protect its users.Final words
I'm not sure if this is a mistake initially made by server developers or client developers, probably both are involved equally. No matter the answer, this exploit is the second largest exploit after CTM
, and it's standing before you.
I'm really proud to present this exploit for you because DC developers need to learn and to see what they are doing, to stop making such trivial mistakes.
Have fun fixing your servers and clients, and ofcourse get prepared for people flooding each other using this exploit, that's what humanity has always been doing ... making war against eachother.
Posted by RoLex
on 2015-02-08 12:42
| 1 comment | 1 likes
Changes in 2.8.5
Fixed: Correctly send $NoReport command to pingers, report by S0RiN
Fixed: Check syntax of oldclean command, report by KCAHDEP
Fixed: Don't notify user commands as messages sent to hub security
Fixed: Missing ban time when adding forbidden MyINFO parts
Changed: myinfadd command parameter syntax to <type> <"lre"> ["time"] ["note"]
Changed: Modify existing forbidden MyINFO item when it's added again
Changed: Restrict access of forced infected user detection report to AVDB
Changed: Replace new line character with space in antivirus detection file names
Changed: Country code gag now uses LRE instead of country code, request by KCAHDEP
Added: Optional parameter to add note for each forbidden MyINFO item, request by Uhlik
Added: Cache for protected users list, it's called too often, we don't want to put high load on MySQL server
Added: lretoplain command to convert LRE to plain text, idea by KCAHDEP
Added: histshowipclass configuration to show user IP in main chat history to users with set class and above, request by KCAHDEP
Removed: Messages on hub restart and stop, hub itself will do that for us
File information: Ledokol 2.8.5
Posted by ledokol
on 2015-01-08 18:40
| 0 comments | 1 likes